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The WTO Framework Agreement negotiators accepted in July 2004 provides a guide to 
the commitments a Doha Development Agenda agreement may contain.  These 
commitments will involve direct and indirect export subsidies, domestic support and 
market access.  Commitments in each of these areas will have implications for Canadian 
agriculture.  This paper explores these implications for supply management, the Canadian 
Wheat Board and domestic support programs.     
 
   2
I n t r o d u c t i o n          
  Relative to the typical lifespan of multilateral trade negotiations, the five years since the 
launch of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) have been a mere blink of the eye.   
Nonetheless, another WTO ministerial meeting will happen in December 2005 and there is hope 
that the participants may be able to agree on a set of modalities (that is rule changes and reduction 
formulas) that will help complete the negotiations for this round.  Our objective is to explore the 




  In July 2004 a “framework agreement” for the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) was 
accepted as a guide for the remainder of the negotiations.
2   This agreement, and subsequent 
discussions, provides a reasonably good indication of what the modalities might look like.  It is 
possible to anticipate the new disciplines for export competition that are likely to emerge from a 
successful ministerial meeting.  All direct export subsidies will be eliminated within a five to 10 
year period, and new disciplines will apply for indirect export subsidies.   To a lesser extent it is 
possible to predict disciplines for domestic support because the Framework preserves the 
fundamental Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) disciplines and adds new disciplines on overall 
support, blue box programs and caps on support for individual commodities.  What is more 
difficult to predict is the outcome of the negotiations on market access.  However, even within 
this pillar of the AoA there is agreement that there will be a tiered formula approach with deeper 
cuts for higher tariffs and there is agreement that flexibility will be provided for self-designated 
“special and sensitive products”.  What isn’t known is the depth of tariff cuts and which products 
will be defined as “special or sensitive”.  
 
  So while there are a number of uncertainties about the details of the modalities, there is 
enough insight as to what might happen that it is time to ask a number of questions about the 
future of Canadian agriculture under the potential new trade disciplines.  Will the elimination of 
export subsidies solve Canada’s agricultural problems? Will the Canadian Wheat Board be 
eliminated?  Is it possible to have effective market access and still have special and sensitive 
products? What are the implications for supply management?   Do disciplines on domestic 
subsidies really make a difference?  This study will attempt to answer these questions with less 
than complete information and patience to see what will happen. 
 
Will Export Subsidy Elimination Solve Canada’s Agricultural Problems? 
 
  Despite a long standing prohibition on subsidies, for industrial products, that are 
contingent on export performance these subsidies persist in markets for agricultural products.  
However, a major achievement of the Uruguay Round AoA is that it put limits on existing export 
subsidies and prohibited the use of new export subsidies (Young, Abbott and Leetma).  The 
Framework Agreement lays out a plan for the elimination of all forms of direct and indirect 
export subsidies in agriculture.
3  Subsidies subject to elimination include direct subsidies; 
government export credit arrangements with terms of more than 6 months
4; government financing 
of exporting state trading enterprises and underwriting the losses of these enterprises; and, food 
aid that is used as a means of surplus disposal or has the effect of displacing commercial sales 
(WTO 2004).
5  Also up for negotiation are the terms and conditions under which export 
monopolies can be used.   
  
From a Canadian perspective does the elimination of direct export subsidies matter?  Yes, 
there are two sectors that are directly affected by export subsidy elimination.  First, although 
Canada is not a major player in international dairy markets, historically it has had to use export   3
subsidies to export products that are surplus to its supply managed regime.  The loss of the export 
market will put financial pressure on domestic milk producers and dairy processors.  In the early 
1990’s Canada’s dairy product exports were valued around $150 million; they peaked in 2001 at 
$425.5 million and then declined to $264.8 million in 2004.  Between 2001 and 2004 the volume 
of dairy product exports declined by 38 percent, largely as a result of coming into compliance 
with the WTO decision on Canada’s dairy export regime that was ruled to provide a illegal export 
subsidy (WTO 2003).
6   Most of these export sales will be lost as a result of the elimination of the 
remaining export subsidies.  However, to put this in perspective, Canada’s farm cash receipts 
from milk sales are about $4.5 billion. 
 
Second, Canadian grain exports have often had to compete against subsidized exports 
from the European Union (EU). Its recent use of export subsidies for grains has been sporadic but 
they may become more frequent given the recent strength of the euro.  As recently as mid-
February 2005 the EU used a small restitution on a wheat sale. Prior to this sale the EU had not 
used a wheat export subsidy since 2003.  Despite reduced intervention prices, the increased value 
of the euro (relative to the US dollar) and increased transportation costs could create pressure for 
the EU to expand its use of export restitutions for grain.
7 What is the probability that the EU will 
be forced to use export subsidies?  A simplistic extrapolation of the potential use of EU export 
subsidies can be assessed by determining the probability that the EU intervention price for wheat 
will exceed the world price for a comparable grade of wheat.  Our analysis suggests that the 
probability of the EU needing to use export subsidies for wheat is 15-30 percent depending on the 
exact assumptions used in the analysis.
8  So, from a practical standpoint there is some value in 
disciplining the EU in their use of export restitutions.  
    
When will the elimination of direct export subsidies occur?  The requirement for the 
parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies, direct and indirect, is likely to prolong the 
process.  However, a larger obstacle is the fact that the current reforms of the EU’s agricultural 
policy will not be completed until 2013.   There is a possibility that the negotiators may agree to a 
multiple track elimination schedule where export subsidies for some commodities (including 
grains) are eliminated relatively quickly (five years) and for other commodities, whose domestic 
prices are more out of line with international prices, export subsidies will be eliminated over a 
longer period (10 years).   
 
The elimination of export subsidies, direct and indirect, will have a small positive impact 
on world grain prices.  The impact on international dairy prices is potentially much larger.   
However, the most fundamental benefit is that the reform will bring agriculture into conformity 
with the rules for industrial products and prevent any backsliding with respect to the use of export 
subsidies. The elimination of export subsidies will not solve Canada’s agricultural problems, but 
it is a long overdue reform of international trading rules. 
 
Will the Canadian Wheat Board be Eliminated? 
 
  The CWB is western Canada’s exclusive exporter of wheat and barley.  As a government 
backed producer marketing board the CWB is classified as a state trading enterprise (STE).  STEs 
are permissible under the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) as long as they are in 
compliance with Article XVII that requires their practices to be consistent with non-
discriminatory behaviour and their sales or purchases are made in accordance with commercial 
practices. 
 
The Framework Agreement only addresses exporting STEs and does not consider 
disciplines on importing STEs such as the Canadian Dairy Commission.
9  The proposed   4
disciplines are to be applied under the export competition provisions of a revised AoA.  Article 
XVII is not being negotiated, so any new disciplines will only apply to agricultural STEs. The 
Framework Agreement calls for the end of “trade distorting practices with respect to exporting 
STEs including eliminating export subsidies provided to or by them, government financing, and 
the underwriting of losses (WTO 2004)”.  Disciplines on the length of term and other conditions 
for export credit sales provided through the CWB are also addressed in the Framework 
Agreement.  Finally, the issue of whether state trading monopolies should be eliminated is under 
negotiation. 
 
  The operations of the CWB are based on three principles: single desk selling, price 
pooling and a government guarantee of the initial payment to producers.  The Framework 
Agreement will result in the eventual elimination of the government guarantee for the CWB’s 
borrowing as well as the guarantee for the initial payment.  Does the elimination of these 
guarantees affect the three core principles of the CWB?   
 
The CWB borrows for a number of reasons: to finance its current operations, to finance 
its current credit sales, and to service old debt.  In 2002/03, the CWB’s net borrowing was $6.4 
billion.
10 Borrowing to service old debt, associated with overdue and rescheduled debt from 
foreign customers was $5.87 billion.  This old debt is associated with credit sales, under the 
Credit Grain Sales Program, which was guaranteed by the Government of Canada and the 
repayment terms have been rescheduled. As such, this debt could be transferred to the books of 
the federal government and for all practical purposes the old debt is not relevant to the potential 
disciplines in the Framework Agreement.
11  The remaining borrowing of $558 million is 
associated with financing new credit sales and the operating expenses (inventory storage, 
inventory financing and grain movement) of the CWB.  The borrowing guarantee allows the 
CWB to obtain better financing than it could if it had to obtain funds commercially. The fact that 
the CWB owns very few assets means that without the government guarantee its credit worthiness 
declines and its borrowing costs increase.  
 
The elimination of the federal governments underwriting of losses also affects the 
guarantee on initial payments.  It is possible for the CWB to establish a contingency fund to 
backstop the initial payment.  However, it will take time to build such a fund. Therefore, the 
CWB may seek a one time infusion of capital to help form a contingency fund and to help it 
reduce its borrowing costs.  Although the CWB has generally been conservative in setting initial 
payments, without the government guarantee it will have to protect itself from sharp price 
declines after initial prices are announced.  Consequently, it will face additional costs associated 
with risk management.  However, the tightening of the financial privileges that the CWB now 
receives is something that it can live with and price pooling and the provision of initial payments 
remain feasible. 
 
The Framework Agreement calls for effective transparency provisions for export 
competition.  The transparency provisions are to be consistent with commercial confidentiality.  
There are currently notification rules that require STEs to report on their activities every three 
years.   The notifications involve a questionnaire concerning the products covered, the reason and 
purpose for the STE, a description of its functions and annual statistical information including 
product quantity and value, and trade flows.  It is unclear what form new reporting requirements 
might take.  The CWB is concerned about reporting information that may be of commercial value 
to its competitors such as transaction specific prices.  Typically, reporting requirements have 
involved yearly aggregations of data similar to the type of information that the CWB already 
provides in its annual report.   5
The biggest issue with respect to the future of the CWB involves the negotiation of its 
continued monopoly status.  The only WTO Member that is on the record in calling for an end of 
monopoly status for exporting STEs is the United States (USDA).  The EU is more interested in 
disciplines on STE behaviour including cross subsidization, price pooling, and exporting at less 
than acquisition price (Abbott and Young).  Banning single desk exporting STEs would create an 
anomaly in WTO disciplines on STEs.   First, the Framework Agreement would maintain 
monopoly status for developing country STEs that are used to preserve domestic price stability 
and to ensure food security. Second, STEs that export industrial products would not be subject to 
the same disciplines.  Third, importing STEs would be allowed to continue their monopoly status.  
Effectively only Canada, Australia and New Zealand would be targeted by this discipline.  The 
issue of “monopoly elimination” may be used as a negotiating chip to seek concessions elsewhere 
in the agricultural negotiations, so it is difficult at this point to speculate on the future of the 
CWB’s monopoly export status 
 
Can Market Access be Improved While Sensitive and Special Products are Given Special 
Treatment? 
 
  The Framework Agreement calls for substantial improvements in market access for all 
products.  The Framework does not define what “substantial” is, but it commits negotiators to 
reducing bound rates using a tiered formula that would make deeper cuts to higher tariffs.  The 
depth of the tariff cut will depend on whether a product is classified as a “non-exempt”, a 
“sensitive”, or a “special” product.  Most agriculture products will not be subject to any special 
exemption.  Market access liberalization for these products will involve a progressive system of 
tariff reduction, with deeper cuts for higher tariffs.  The exact size of the tariff cut will be 
determined by the level of the current bound tariff and the development status of the country.  
Negotiators are now working from a proposal tabled by the G-20
12 that contains five tariff tiers 
for developed countries and four for developing countries (ICITSD).  Controversy surrounds the 
issue of whether “flexibility” will be allowed inside each tariff tier, or if all products in a given 
tier should face the same size cut.  The EU argues that there must be flexibility on the size of cut, 
in each tier, while most other negotiators feel that if any flexibility is allowed it should be sharply 
constrained.  In addition to the basic tariff cutting formula, the G-20 also advocates that 
individual tariffs be capped at 100 percent for developed countries and 150 percent for 
developing countries.  This issue is not yet resolved.   
 
  Members will also be allowed to self select an appropriate number of sensitive products 
that will be given special consideration in the application of the tariff harmonization formula.  
The only selection criterion appears to be to take “account of existing commitments for these 
products (WTO 2004)”.  Presumably the list of “sensitive” products will include, at most, those 
products already protected by tariff rate quotas (TRQs).
13  The Framework Agreement stipulates 
that “substantial improvement” in market access will apply for these sensitive products, but it 
does not explain how this improvement will be less substantial than for non-exempt products.  
The improvement in market access is to be accomplished by a combination of tariff cuts and the 
expansion of tariff rate quotas.  This suggests that the smaller the tariff cut the bigger the 
expansion of the tariff rate quota.  The average over-quota duty, for all Members notifying TRQs, 
is 128 percent (Gibson et al.).  Given the very high over-quota rates it is likely that, at best, tariff 
liberalization will only take the redundant protection out of the tariffs and effective liberalization 
will depend on quota expansion (Gifford).
 It is through the specification of sensitive products that 
Canada hopes to spare its supply managed commodities from significant new import competition. 
 
  Special and differential treatment will be available to developing countries in terms of 
smaller tariff reductions and TRQ expansion and in their capacity to select a number of “special   6
products”.  These “special products” will enjoy still greater flexibility.  Unlike “sensitive 
products” there are criteria for selecting “special products” and these criteria include food 
security, livelihood security and rural development needs.   
 
As a major agrifood exporter Canada has a huge stake in pushing for improved market 
access especially for consumer ready products.  This means Canada should be a strong proponent 
for using a harmonization formula for tariff reductions and for rules to reduce tariff escalation. 
Canadian consumers will benefit as Canada’s tariffs come down and a greater variety of lower 
cost imports are made available.  From this perspective the creation of a new class of “special” 
and “sensitive” products is troubling.  While Canada’s producers of supply managed commodities 
have a vested interest in maintaining protection for their commodities, the creation of a set of 
“special and sensitive” products risks creating a permanent set of products where serious trade 
liberalization will be delayed for decades.  Since sugar and rice will be prominent among the list 
of “sensitive” products in developed countries it sends the wrong signal to developing countries 
that have a comparative advantage in producing these crops.  At the very least, the number of 
tariff lines treated differently must be very limited, in-quota tariffs for these commodities should 
be reduced to zero and meaningful minimum access commitments created. 
 
What are the Expected Impacts on Supply Management? 
 
   The modalities on market access will be by far the most difficult to resolve in Hong 
Kong.  These are the issues that are also the most important to Canada’s supply managed sectors.  
All supply managed products have tariffs far in excess of 80 percent so these products will be 
classified in the fifth tier and face the most aggressive cuts (probably in excess of 60 percent).   
No doubt Canada will attempt to notify all products derived from supply managed inputs as 
“sensitive”.  However, these sectors will not be entirely insulated from competition.  One possible 
modality for sensitive products is to require quota expansion to be proportional to the reduction in 
the tariff cutting formula.  For example, a 50 percent reduction in the formula cut may require a 
doubling of the in-quota access.  
 
  The Canadian dairy sector will have to adjust to the elimination of export subsides, the 
expansion of tariff rate quota volumes and a ceiling on product specific domestic support that will 
limit increases in support prices for the dairy sector.  Incremental increases in minimum access 
combined with export subsidy elimination can have a significant positive impact on world dairy 
prices given how little is traded and this will partially relieve the competitive pressures faced by 
this sector.   
 
  It is unlikely that Canada will be able to export dairy products without subsidies. 
Canada’s export subsidy commitments currently limit subsidized export volumes to 44.9 
thousand tonnes of skim milk powder, 3.5 thousand tonnes of butter, 9.1 thousand tonnes of 
cheese and 30.2 thousand tones of other dairy products.  Canada has not notified export subsidies 
since 1999 and consequently it is difficult to determine the exact quantities of subsidized dairy 
products that are exported.  Nonetheless, yearly exports of skim milk powder have seldom 
exceeded the volume commitment and this is not a significant amount of skim milk powder to 
absorb into the domestic market.  Exports of butter in recent years have been minuscule.  Cheese 
and other dairy products are exported in higher volumes, and while some of these products are 
sufficiently unique not to require subsidization products sold as bulk commodities do require 
subsidization.    
 
  Over-quota dairy tariffs range from 200-300 percent.   Formula reductions for “sensitive 
products” will still result in prohibitively high dairy tariffs.
14  Canada’s dairy TRQs currently   7
represent less than 3 percent of consumption (zero percent SMP; 4 percent butter; and 7 percent 
cheese).  A likely outcome of the market access negotiations for “sensitive” dairy products could 
increase minimum access to 7-10 percent of an updated base level of consumption. This increase 
in market access commitments will create some additional pressure for adjustments in the 
domestic dairy market either through a corresponding reduction in domestic production or a 
decline in domestic prices.  Lariviere and Meilke, using 1995 data, suggest that requiring a 
minimum access commitment of 7 percent of domestic consumption under dairy product TRQs 
could lower Canada’s butter and cheese prices by 11 percent and 1 percent respectively and 
increase skim milk powder prices by 2 percent.  
 
  Finally, the product specific ceilings on domestic support may force the dairy industry 
away from cost of production based administered prices to prices negotiated between milk 
producers and processors.  Prices determined in this fashion would not be subject to AMS 
disciples.  This may help to constrain future increases in milk prices that, at the producer level, 
are about 40 percent higher than in the highly protected United States dairy market (Meilke, 
Sarker and Le Roy).     
 
The situation facing the poultry sector is somewhat different.  This sector will not face 
pressure from a cap on product specific AMS support as there is no notified market price support 
for these commodities.  Likewise, this sector will not face disciplines on export subsidies.  Market 
access as a percentage of domestic consumption is also higher for poultry than for dairy.  In 2000, 
imports as a percentage of domestic consumption were 7.5 percent for broilers, 21 percent for 
hatching eggs, and 5 percent for turkeys and for eggs (Canadian Broiler Hatching Egg Marketing 
Agency, et al.). As a consequence these sectors should face less pressure from liberalized market 
access.  During the early 2000’s Canada’s chicken prices were 15-20 percent above those in the 
United States; however with the recent strength of the Canadian dollar the price gap has increased 
to around 30 percent (Huff, Meilke and Amedei).   
 
Does Domestic Support Really Matter? 
 
The AoA introduced disciplines on domestic agricultural subsidies that are not applied to 
industrial products.  These disciplines categorize support as either subject to reduction 
commitments or exempt. The Framework Agreement preserves the fundamentals of the AoA 
domestic support disciplines while adding several new requirements (WTO 2004).  First, there is 
to be a reduction in total support (that is the sum of final bound total AMS plus both de minimis 
exemptions and blue box support). This reduction comes in parts.  In the first year of the 
implementation period Members must reduce total support by 20 percent. Additional reductions 
in total support are based on a tiered formula that encompasses the principle of harmonization 
where Members with higher levels of support face larger reduction commitments.  There seems to 
be general agreement that there will be three or four domestic support tiers and that the EU will 
be in the tier with the highest level of support, but there is disagreement about how other 
countries will be positioned into the remaining tiers and on the size of cut in each tier.  Second, 
the final bound AMS and permitted de minimis levels will also be reduced over the 
implementation period.  Tiered harmonization reductions will also apply to the total AMS (but 
not necessarily the same formula as for total support).  Caps on support levels for specific 
commodities are to be negotiated to prevent shifts of support between commodities.  Reductions 
in de minimis support will also be negotiated.  Third, blue box support will be capped at five 
percent of a Member’s average historic total value of production.  The blue box criteria are also 
being renegotiated.  The Framework Agreement describes two types of blue box programs, direct 
payments that are either associated with production limiting programs (requires production) or 
payments that do not require production at all.  Fourth, green box criteria will be reviewed and   8
clarified to further remove its trade distorting elements but at the same time taking into account 
non-trade concerns.   
 
From the perspective of many WTO Members, especially developing countries, a 
successful Round will depend on how much additional discipline is applied to the domestic 
programs in the EU and the US.  Since 1995 the US and EU have reformed their domestic 
policies towards less distorting measures.  Many of these revised programs have been notified as 
green box measures.  The major development in the Framework Agreement is the commitment to 
reduce total non-green support, most likely in the range of 50-60 percent.  In a sense this overall 
limit is the price that the EU and the US have to pay in order to not face reductions in green box 
support.  However, as Brink demonstrates the US would be able to reduce its overall domestic 
support base by 75 percent, and still not be constrained in its domestic farm spending.  Likewise 
the EU would be able to reduce its overall domestic support base by 79 percent and still not face a 
binding commitment.  If however, the negotiators are able to find the political will to cut 
domestic support so that the overall commitment becomes a binding constraint, this commitment 
will limit spending on the individual components of domestic support. For instance, a sufficiently 
aggressive reduction in overall support may create an effective limit on blue box support that is 
well below the 5 percent cap.  
 
The impact of potential new WTO disciplines on Canada’s domestic support 
expenditures is difficult to assess.  Canada has not notified domestic support since 2000.  At that 
time domestic amber box spending was 21 percent of the AoA bound AMS limit.  Since then 
government expenditures have increased as a result of BSE related expenditures and the 
introduction of the Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS) program.  At this time it is 
not clear how Canada will notify its CAIS payments.  Green box (reduction exempt) programs 
require that payments be determined by income losses that exceed 30 percent of average gross 
income.  However, CAIS begins to pay once the production margin falls below the reference 
margin.  Canada has historically notified most of its safety net spending as non-product specific 
de minimis expenditures, but potential reductions in de minimis support may offer less 
opportunity to use this reporting option.  Another important issue for domestic support reform 
facing Canada is the constraints on product specific support which may put pressure on market 
price support for dairy and certain product specific provincial programs. 
 
The Framework Agreement adds more structure to the existing domestic support 
disciplines with disciplines on overall trade distorting support and limits on blue box 
expenditures.  However, how effective the disciplines will be in limiting trade distorting support 
is yet to be determined and it will depend on how aggressive the tiered formula reductions are for 
overall and total AMS support.  One thing is fairly clear – the domestic support disciplines will 
not sharply limit spending on the agricultural sector by developed countries willing to shift 
support into the blue and green boxes.  As a result, subsidy envy by producers in some developed 




The Framework Agreement provides the basic building blocks on which the DDA will be 
constructed.  Like any skeleton it does not describe the features or specifics of the final product, 
but it does give an indication of the basic structure of a future agreement.  In terms of ambition, a 
final judgment must await agreement on the modalities but it appears that the Framework is 
ambitious enough to keep the process of liberalization going, but it also reflects as much concern 
among the negotiators with continuing protection for special interests as with promoting 
opportunities for healthy competition.    9
What does the Framework mean for Canada? Canadian negotiators were looking for the 
elimination of all agricultural export subsidies as quickly as possible.  The Framework will 
eventually eliminate direct export subsidies but this is unlikely to happen before 2016.   
Disciplines on government involvement in agricultural export credit programs are long awaited 
and should help to bring agriculture closer to the set of subsidy disciplines that apply to other 
sectors.  Any discomfort that these disciplines might create for the CWB should be far less than 
the benefit of knowing that the US will have less opportunity to promote its exports by offering 
export financing conditions that are better than those offered in a competitive market.  
 
 The loss of the government guarantee will force the CWB to develop innovative risk 
management techniques to underwrite its own losses.  Furthermore, the CWB will need to 
increase its asset base in order to be able to establish a solid credit rating and to lower its 
borrowing costs. Canada may have to accept some discipline on the actions of single desk STEs, 
but the negotiators are still arguing from a strong position that disciplines for developed country 
agricultural exporting STEs should not be significantly different from the disciplines applied to 
all other STEs. 
 
Canada was seeking a variety of market access negotiating techniques that would open 
foreign markets to the greatest possible extent while still protecting import sensitive domestic 
industries.  The Framework introduces a category of sensitive products.  Market access 
liberalization for sensitive products will be made through a combination of tariff reductions and 
tariff rate quota expansion.   The supply managed sector needs to have an appreciation of the 
potential reforms and the implications.  The dairy sector faces limits on increased support prices 
because of product specific AMS caps, increased competition from an increased volume of in-
quota access, and the probable loss of a small export market.  These impacts are relatively small 
and the industry should be able to adjust.  It certainly does not mean the end of supply 
management. 
 
It is not in Canada’s interest that a plethora of exemptions be created with respect to 
market access commitments. It is important that the base for tariff rate quota expansion be 
established through coherent and equitable criteria, and that Members are discouraged from 
ignoring these criteria in their final offers.   Reducing the dispersion of tariffs and their escalation 
is a goal that Canadian negotiators should be seeking given the proportion of our exports that are 
consumer ready. 
 
 The Canadian negotiators were seeking an overall limit on all types of domestic support 
(green, blue and amber programs) and the maximum possible reduction in amber and blue box 
support.  The Framework will discipline the total amount of AMS, blue box, and de minimis 
support.  At this time it is not known how large the required reduction in de minimis support will 
be, but a smaller threshold may create a challenge for Canada in terms of meeting its domestic 
support commitments.  The harmonization approach will be more aggressive in reducing 
subsidies in those countries that subsidize the most.  Product specific caps on amber box support 
will prevent Members from continuing to provide trade distorting domestic support to selected 
sectors, as overall support levels are reduced.  While these disciplines may not reduce the total 
level of support used in the EU or US, the reforms prevent a return to more distorting forms of 
support or increases in the level of support.     
 
The next touchstone for the DDA negotiations is the Hong Kong Ministerial meeting in 
December 2005.  However, as stressed in this paper a number of difficult technical issues still 
confront the negotiators, especially with respect to market access. In addition, political will is 
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1 This paper draws heavily upon the material in Rude and Meilke that provides a more detailed summary of 
the implications of the Framework Agreement. 
 
2 The official WTO (2004) document refers to the Framework Agreement as a “work programme” but we 
will use the more familiar term in this review. 
 
3 Direct subsidies provide an explicit price subsidy to either the exporting or importing agent, lowering the 
price of the traded good. Indirect subsidies provide non-price benefits that ultimately lower the final cost to 
the importer. 
 
4 The US accounts for 88 percent of the subsidy elements of those export credit programs examined by 
OECD.  The OECD analysis examined the impact of export credit programs on world wheat markets and 
found the degree of distortion to be relatively small for the time period studied (1998). 
 
5 For loans under six months, additional disciplines will be negotiated with respect to minimum interest 
rates, insurance premium benchmarks and other loan conditions. 
 
6 The large increase in exports leading up to 2001 was due to a special export program that sold milk to 
Canadian processors at lower prices when the products made from the milk were exported at world prices.  
This program was ruled as a prohibited export subsidy after a series of WTO panels.  Following  this 
decision Canadian dairy product exports declined. 
 
7 Prior to 1992, the EU intervention price for wheat was 155 euro/mt and through a series of reforms it was 
reduced to 101 euro/mt in 2001 (about C$160/mt at 2005 exchange rates). 
 
8 Distributions on the US Gulf price of soft red winter wheat and the euro/dollar exchange rate were 
obtained from weekly data for the period August 1, 1997 to February 4, 2005.  Given these distributions, 
the probability of the intervention price exceeding the US Gulf price, adjusted for the euro/dollar exchange 
rate and transfer costs, can be determined.   
 
9 The Canadian Dairy Commission has been granted the exclusive right to import butter; other dairy 
products are imported by the private trade under tariff-rate quota regimes. 
 
10 Goodloe reports that the gross borrowings of the CWB were $26.2 billion in 2002/03. 
 
11 The CWB benefits from the interest payments on this restructured debt. Goodloe claims that these 
interest earnings “more than covered the costs of running the CWB”. 
 
12 The G-20 is a group of developing countries that are active negotiating participants. The group includes 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela. 
 
13 Only 50 percent of the TRQs notified to the WTO actually utilized the quota restriction and the 
remaining cases are administered as simple tariffs so some of these products may not be notified as 
‘sensitive’.  Many of these cases involve developing countries.  Developed countries TRQs are prevalent 
for dairy, sugar, meats, and cereals. 
 
14 Meilke, Lariviere, and Martin show that a 50 percent reduction in current over-quota tariffs would not be 
sufficient to bring the landed price below the current domestic price. 